In financially integrated markets, capital should flow across borders in order to insure that the price of risk (i.e., the compensation investors receive for bearing risk) is equalized across assets. Conversely, if capital controls or other forces prevent free movement of capital across borders, then it is likely that different economies will demand different levels of compensation for risk. In some markets, direct measures of the severity of capital controls are available. For example, some countries have dual classes of common equity. Restricted equity can only be held by domestic residents while unrestricted equity can be held by both domestic and foreign investors. The price differential between restricted and unrestricted shares that have identical payoffs is a direct measure of the effects of capital controls [e.g., Hietala (1989) and Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) 1. Similarly, differences in official and black market exchange rates, between official and off-shore interest rates, or between the market price and the net asset value of closedend country mutual funds [e.g., Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley (1990) ] can be used to measure the effects of capital controls.
A difficulty arises when attempting inter-country comparisons of the severity of capital controls because different countries may have different mechanisms for restricting capital movements. For example, a country which prohibits all foreign investment does not have unrestricted shares whose prices can be compared to restricted shares. Also, countries without any formal restrictions against foreign investment will not have restricted shares trading. While the former case is ostensibly one of segmented markets and the latter case is one of integrated markets, there may be methods by which investors circumvent the restrictions in the former case and there may be informal barriers which lead to defacto segmentation in the latter case (such as less stringent accounting standards or insider trading regulations).
Given the difficulty of directly comparing the effects of the wide array of official capital controls across countries, a measure of deviations from capital market integration that can be consistently applied across countries is important for cross-sectional analyses of the effects of market segmentation. The approach taken here is to measure deviations from integration by measuring the deviations of asset returns from an equilibrium model of returns constructed assuming market integration. Alternative approaches to measuring the integration of developed and emerging markets are developed in Bekaert (1995) and Bekaert and Harvey (1995) .
When testing the law of one price (LOP) in financial markets we first need a model of which type of risk is important to investors. The model used here is the International Arbitrage Pricing Theory (IAPT). An advantage of an approach that relies on asset prices or returns is that effective barriers to capital flows, regardless of their source, should lead to actual deviations from LOP. Statutory barriers to capital flows that are ineffective should not lead to pricing deviations.
Conversely, ostensibly free markets with large non-statutory barriers (such as large differentials in information costs) should exhibit pricing deviations.
A disadvantage of the approach is that it relies on a particular asset pricing model and the assumption that the equilibrium asset pricing relation is stable. Regime shifts, such as those one would expect when an economy moves from being segmented to integrated, will lead to changes in the asset pricing relation and to large short-term measured deviations from LOP. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) propose a model in which markets can move between segmented and integrated regimes. Within a regime, assets are priced as though assets are not demanded as hedges against regime shifts.
The next section of the paper contains a brief description of the asset pricing model. In Section 2 pricing errors are related to the existence of deviations from the law of one price induced by market segmentation. In Section 3 the issue of the effects of regime shifts is addressed. I describe the data in Section 4. The techniques used to estimate the pervasive factors are described in Section 5. The empirical measures of deviations from the law of one price are described in section 6.
1.
Multi-factor Asset Pricing
The logic behind the Arbitrage Pricing Theory [Ross (1976) ] and intemational extensions of the APT [Ross and Walsh (1983), Solnik (1983) , Levine (1989), and Clyman, Edelson, and Hiller (1991) ] is that there are a small number of risks which are common to most assets, for which investors command risk premia. Risk that is specific to one asset (or a small set of assets)
is diversifiable and, therefore, investors do not demand compensation for this risk.
A. (1) where bj; is the sensitivity of asset j to the ith common source of risk, 6j is the realization of risk factor i in period t, and K.t = Et-1 (rj) is the expected return on asset i. In this case where there is no asset specific risk, we could create a riskless, costless arbitrage opportunity unlessl:
We need to assume that there are more assets than sources of risk (n > k) and that the n x k matrix of sensitivities, b (where the (j,i) element of b is b,,), has rank k.
where Xt is the return on a riskless asset and X, is the risk premium on the ith source of risk.
More generally, we could express expected returns as
Jl, = ct + ka, + bj X + --+ bjkX, *
where aj represents the pricing error, or deviation of expected returns from the predictions of the multi-factor asset pricing model. The appendix contains a proof that aj must equal zero for all i in order for there to be no arbitrage opportunities. However a simple example will suffice to convey the intuition of the result.
Assume that there is only one risk factor (k = 1) and three assets with the following risk parameters, bl = 1.0, bzl = 0.5, b3l = 0.75, and expected return of R, = 11.5%, Pi 2 = 7.5%, and p3 = 11.0%. With X 0 = 4% and XA = 8% the model's pricing errors (deviations of ft from % + b;lkj are a, = -0.5%, a 2 = -0.5%, and a 3 = 1.0%. We will form a portfolio that invests $1 in asset three and takes a short position of $0.50 in each of assets 1 and 2. The cost of the portfolio is zero and from (1) and (3) the return on the portfolio is:
(a 3 -0.5a, -0.5a 2 ) + (4 -0.5k -0.5°O) + (b3l -0.5b 11 -0.5bzl)(Xl + °; = 1.5% + 0 x k 0 + 0 x (X 1 + 614) = 2.0%.
Thus, the portfolio provides a costless and riskless return of 2.0%.
B. The Arbitrage Approach to Asset Pricing with Diversifiable Asset-Speciric Risk
The expression for asset returns in (1) assumes that there are only k world-wide factors that influence all asset returns. We can generalize this specifi'ttion to inctfide uncertainty that is asset specific, or diversifiable. Returns will be expressed as:
where el, is the uncertainty in asset j's returns that is not explained by the world-wide factors. Ross (1976) assumes that there are an infinite number of assets and that the asset-specific risks are uncorrelated across assets (i.e., corr(Eit, cm = 0 for j -m). Ross notes that weaker conditions also imply that the risk embodied in the term Ej, is diversifiable [see Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) , Connor and Korajczyk (1993) ].
Since each asset has its own unique, or asset specific, risk, it will not be possible to form riskless portfolios from a finite set of risky assets. However, we can define an asymptotic arbitrage opportunity as one in which we can construct a sequence of portfolios whose expected returns approach infinity and whose variance approaches zero as the number of assets, n, approaches infinity. The absence of such arbitrage opportunities implies that the sum of squared pricing deviations (a' + cd + ... + a) must remain finite as n approaches infinity [Ross (1976) and Huberman (1982) ].
The fact that the sum of squared pricing deviations must remain finite implies (in an economy with an infinite number of assets) that most of the pricing errors must be small and that (2) holds as an approximation for most assets:
Further restrictions can be placed on the economy to get the pricing model to hold as an equality [e.g., see Connor (1984) and Constantinides (1989) ]. I will assume that, under the null hypothesis of financial market integration, either such restrictions hold or the approximation is good enough to ignore the approximation error in (5).
Segmentation Leads to Pricing Errors (a's) Relative to International Risk Factors
While the method of estimating the risk factors is described more fully below, it is useful at this juncture to point out that capital market segmentation prevents cross-market arbitrage and, therefore, prevents the prices of risk (the vector X) from being equated across markets. This will lead to pricing errors relative to risk factors constructed assuming capital market integration. To illustrate this, consider a hypothetical world consisting of two markets (a and b) that are influenced by the same single world factor. That is, assets in each economy satisfy a one-factor pricing model. However, since the markets are segmented the parameters of the asset pricing model are different across markets.
!,=
M4 + bj, 1 xl
with ) -4 and kXl ^ . However, the implied riskless return and world factor risk premium estimated by pooling the two markets together and assuming that they are integrated will be (assuming the markets are of equivalent size) X 0 = (4 + 4)/2 and X 1 = (Xa + Xb)/2. This implies that for assets in economy a, the measured pricing deviation (relative to a model estimated assuming integration) of asset j is 6 o = (4 -ko) + bj 1 (lI -ki)
and for assets in economy b, the measured pricing deviation of asset j is cb = (X -0) + .-1 ).
Thus, the mispricing parameters, a, provide a direct measure of deviations from the law of one price.
3.

Regime Shifts
The pricing errors in (6) and (7) are derived assuming that each economy is in a steadystate segmented equilibrium each period. However, the recent trend in most markets is movement from segmented markets toward integrated markets. This implies that the asset pricing regimes will shift from segmented to integrated regimes. In the long run, this should lead to smaller pricing errors (zero pricing errors in the limit as we approach complete integration). However, in the short run we will see larger measured pricing errors as asset prices change due to the changes in asset pricing regimes. Since the movement from a completely segmented market to a completely integrated market is rarely smooth, the asset pricing dynamics during the transition phase are difficult to characterize. In particular, if market participants anticipate the liberalization from a segmented to integrated market, asset expected returns in the transition period are not likely to be set according to models assuming complete segmentation or complete integration.
To illustrate the short-term effects of regime shifts I will consider the somewhat artificial but tractable example of a market which changes unexpectedly from being completely segmented from world markets to being completely integrated. Assume that under complete segmentation the Then asset j will have a price equal to:
To make the example concrete, assume that, for the closed-economy (segmented market)
case there are two risk factors (a world factor and a domestic factor) that are correlated with the marginal utility of consumption; the domestic representative investor has a time preference While the numerical results are clearly dependent on the numbers picked for the example, the fact still remains that shifts across pricing regimes are likely to cause large measures of mispricing in the short run.
4.
Data Sources and Summary Statistics
Historical monthly equity returns data for individual stocks trading in twenty emerging markets are from the Emerging Markets Database provided by the International Finance
Corporation. The countries covered by the database are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The set of emerging markets are geographically diverse as well as diverse in the severity of capital controls.
The sample of developed equity markets includes stocks from Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A summary of the developed markets equity data sources is presented in Table 1 . The sample includes all assets traded on the Australian Stock Exchange, the 9 New York and American Stock Exchanges, the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange and the U.K. unlisted securities market.
Monthly retums adjusted for dividends and stock splits, are transformed into US dollar retums using end-of-month exchange rates. 1975 and 1980 (i.e ., failed to emerge) and were thus not included in the sample.
As illustrated in Table 2 , the average number of firms ranges from 11 (Zimbabwe) to 66 (Indonesia). The capitalization (as of December 1992) of the stocks included in the database ranges from $268 million (Zimbabwe) to $66 billion (Mexico). Average monthly turnover (volume for month t divided by the capitalization of the market in month t-1) for the sample period is the lowest for Nigeria at 0.05% and is the highest for Taiwan at 23.66%. Table 3 reports some statistics for the return distributions of the IFC emerging market indices. The average monthly rate of return, in $US, (column 2) is the lowest for Indonesia (-1.02%) and the highest for Argentina (5.66%). The variability of the index returns is also quite high. Jordan has the smallest monthly standard deviation of 5.17% while Argentina has the largest monthly standard deviation of 30%. The S&P 500 portfolio, by contrast, has a monthly standard deviation (over the January 1976 -December 1992 period) of 4.46%.
11
5.
Construction of Factor-Mimicking Portfolios
To estimate the excess returns on the factor-mimicking portfolios I use the asymptotic principal components technique of Connor and Korajczyk (1986, 1988) . The asymptotic principal components procedure can easily accommodate the large number of stocks in our sample. The procedure assumes the factor structure in (4); that the exact multifactor pricing relationship, (2), holds; that the conditional factor loadings, bp, are constant through time for most assets; and that the cross-sectional average asset specific variance is constant through time. Let T be the number of time periods over which we observe asset returns; n the number of securities; r 1 the n x T matrix of excess returns on the assets; F the k x T matrix of realized factors plus risk premia (F,,
b" the n x k matrix of factor loadings, and E" the n x k matrix of idiosyncratic (asset specific) returns. Equations (2) and (4) imply that:
with: E(Fe"') = 0, E(en) = 0, and E(En'm/D = Vn.
Let Qn be the T x T matrix defined by S2' = r"'r'/n and F' the k x T matrix of the first k eigenvectors of Q'. Under the assumption that asset returns follow a k-factor model as in (4), Connor and Korajczyk (1986) show that F' converges in probability to a non-singular linear transformation of F as n goes to infinity. Because of our large sample of equity returns, I ignore the estimation error in F'. In order to use all available data in our sample I employ an extension of the principal components technique from Connor and Korajczyk (1988) which does not require that asset returns exhibit continuous time series of returns. This method is designed to avoid a common source of survivorship bias. While these types of factor portfolios do not fully explain the pricing of international equities, they perform well relative to common alternative models [Korajczyk and Viallet (1989) ].
I use the returns on all stocks from the twenty-four national stock markets to estimate the factor-mimicking portfolios. For an average month in the period January 1976 to December 1992
there are 6851 firms with available retums from the twenty-four markets.
Measuring Deviations from the Law of One Price
The pricing deviations discussed in Section 1 and 2 were expressed as discrepancies between an asset's true expected return and the expected return implied by the asset pricing model. However, we do not observe the true expected returns on the asset, we observe the ex post return on the asset. From (4), we see that the asset's ex post return deviates from its expected return due to (i) shocks from the common factors and (ii) asset specific shocks.
The assumption of an factor structure and the asset pricing theory [equations (4) and (2)] imply restrictions on a multivariate regression of asset returns on a constant and the excess returns on factor-mimicking portfolios, which are embodied in (8). The restriction is that the intercepts are jointly equal to zero. That is, in the multivariate regression: rn = a' + bnF + £n (9) a', the vector of intercept terms, are the pricing deviations. If markets are integrated and the multifactor asset pricing model describes asset expected returns a' should be equal to zero.
However, if risks are priced differently across economies, these pricing differences will lead to non-zero values of a. Thus, one measure of financial integration is the size of the intercept terms in the multivariate regression (9). The approach that I take is as follows:
1) Estimate factor-mimicking portfolios for using the asymptotic principal components procedure.
2) For each national market estimate (9) for all stocks individually in that market. This estimation will yield vectors of mispricing estimates, cVi.
3) Calculate a summary measure of the mispricing for each national market.
Since we are concemed about deviations (both positive and negative) of a from zero, a natural measure of mispricing across the assets is the average squared mispricing coefficient, ot'an/n. However, the regressions provide only an estimate of an, an, not the true value. This implies that average squared values of the estimates, aW'Cc/n, will converge to aca'c/n plus the average squared value of the estimation error. Thus, da'cc/n will yield an upwardly biased estimate of aot'c/n. However, the bias for asset i, a2 -ac has an expected value equal to the variance of the intercept coefficient. Let v; denote the estimated variance of the regression intercept for asset i and let the n-vector of these variances for n assets be v'. Given v', an adjusted average squared pricing error can be calculated as H = Cz' 0 ia/n -vn'j/n, where l is an nvector of ones. The quantity 6 will be called the average adjusted mispricing for the n assets. In the empirical analysis we use estimates, vi, which are corrected for conditional heteroskedasticity, as in White (1980) .
Under the null hypothesis that a n = 0, the expected value of 6 is zero. Thus, if capital markets are integrated and share the same set of pervasive risks, the average adjusted mispricing should be close to zero. One would expect that this measure of mispricing will tend to be larger the more severe the barriers to free capital flows. One would also expect the periods of transition from segmented to integrated markets would be associated with large average adjusted mispricing as asset prices adjust to a different equilibrium level.
Rather than emphasize formal statistical tests, I wish to characterize the cross-sectional and time-series characteristics of the estimated mispricing and relate the behavior of the measures to changes in capital controls in the various markets. Through this characterization of the empirical properties of the mispricing, or market segmentation, measures we should get some sense of the forces causing the measured deviations from LOP. Average adjusted mispricing is estimated for each of the twenty-four national markets (twenty emerging markets and four developed markets).
Since the severity of capital controls is likely to vary through time, I estimate a time series of 0's, rather than estimate each country's adjusted mispricing for the entire sample period. There is also a large increase in mispricing in 1990. After several years of a socialist government (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) ) and a year in which two elections failed to produce a clear winning party, the Sources of information on economic and political developments as well as extant capital controls in emerging markets are Chuppe and Atkin (1992), International Finance Corporation (1993) Park and Van Agtmael (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1994) .
conservative party was elected to power in April 1990. There was a 590-return to holding the portfolio of stocks in the IFC index in April 1990 followed, two months later, by a 44% return in June 1990. There was a subsequent decline in prices in late 1990.
The average adjusted mispricing values for India are generally small except in the 1985-1987 period and the 1991-1992 period. This later period includes a balance of payments crisis in mid-1991 followed by a series of reforms phasing-in full convertibility of the Rupee. Restrictions on institutional investment in Indian equities were loosened in 1992. In April 1992 it was disclosed that a number of banks were illegally investing funds in the Indian equity market. The disclosure lead to a sharp decline (approximately 40%) in the equity market.
The time-series sample for Indonesia ( Figure 10 ) is rather short. Because of this, it is difficult to detect particular patterns in the average adjusted mispricing.
Jordan ( Figure 11 ) exhibits some of the smallest absolute levels of average adjusted pricing amongst the emerging markets. It also exhibits the lowest volatility and one of the lowest mean returns amongst the emerging markets (Table 3) The Zimbabwe stock market (Figure 23 ) shows generally high levels of adjusted mispricing. This is consistent with the fact that the market has been closed to foreign investment throughout the sample period.
7.
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work
In this paper I suggest a measure of the deviations from the law of one price across potentially segmented capital markets. This measure is applied to stock returns from 24 national markets (four developed markets and 20 emerging markets). The measure of market segmentation tends to be much larger for emerging markets than the developed markets which is consistent with larger barriers to capital flows into or out of the emerging markets. The measure often tends to 19 decrease through time which is consistent with growing levels of integration. Large values of adjusted mispricing also occur around periods of economic turbulence and periods in which capital controls change significantly. Thus, the adjusted mispricing estimates measure not only the level of deviations from the law of one price, but also measure the revaluations inherent in moving from one regime to another.
Relating the proposed measure of market integration to alternative measures of integration, to measures of capital market development, or to ex post measures of economic growth would be useful in highlighting its advantages and disadvantages.
Bekaert and Harvey (1995) plot the estimated probability of being in the integrated regime (their Figure 2 ). There are some interesting similarities and differences in the conclusions that 20 Levine and Zervos (1994, 1995) find that the adjusted mispricing measure proposed here is negatively correlated with economic growth and that the levels of adjusted mispricing decline after liberalization of restrictions on capital flows. Thus, along several dimensions the proposed measure of integration yields results that are consistent with reasonable priors about the relation between effective integration, explicit capital controls, capital market development and economic growth.
Appendix
Let us assume that the pricing model in (2) is an n-vector of ones and b is an n x k matrix whose (i, i) element is b,i. In matrix notation (3) can be expressed as:
The pricing error minimizing value of lambda (in terms of minimizing the sum of squared pricing errors) is k = (B'B)-'B'p. and a = (I -B(B'B)-'B')p., where I is an n x n identity matrix . Note that a'B = 0, so that a portfolio formed by choosing the portfolio weight on asset i to be a, is costless (since a't = 0) and is riskless (since a'b = 0 which implies that the portfolio has no exposure to the risk factors). The expected return on the portfolio is a'g = a'a + a'BX = a'a + 0 > 0.
Thus, we have formed a riskless, costless portfolio with a strictly positive return. This is an arbitrage opportunity that will be exploited. Thus, in order to avoid arbitrage opportunities, the pricing relation (2) must hold. That is, we must have that aJ = 0 for all j in (3). 
